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Forensic Science: 
Seizing Evidence From Suspects for 
. Forensic Analysis 
. As the O.J. Simpson case illus­
trates, trace evidence can be used to 
establish a link between a suspect and 
a crime scene. Blood, semen, hair, 
fibers, soil, and fmgerprints have all 
been used in this manner. In addition, 
bite marks, gunshot residues, hand­
writing, and voice exemplars have 
been used to connect a suspect and a 
crime. In some cases, procedures as 
invasive as the surgical removal of 
bullets from suspects has occurred. 
Moreover, the advent of DNA profil­
ing and DNA data banks foreshadow 
an increase in the use of scientific 
evidence. 
These techniques often require the 
suspect's cooperation, ranging from 
passive presence for fmgerprinting or 
blood extraction to active participa­
tion in providing voice or handwrit­
ing samples. This contact between 
the police and a suspect implicates 
several constitutional rights: (1) the 
privilege against self-incrimination; 
(2) the right to counsel; (3) the right 
to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures; and (4) due process. 
This column examines these issues. 
Self-Incrimination 
Testimonial vs. Physical Evidence 
The leading case on the applicabil­
ity of the Fifth Amendment privilege 
*Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Rich­
ard W. Weatherh ead Professor of Law, 
Case Western Reserve Universit y. This 
column is based in part on P. Giannelli 
& E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence 
(2d ed. 1 99 3) .  Reprinted with permis­
sion. 
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to the collection of physical evidence 
is Schmerber v. California. 1 While 
being treated at a hospital for injuries 
sustained in an automobile collision, 
Schmerber was arrested for driving 
under the influence of alcohol. At the 
direction of the investigating police 
officer, a physician obtained a blood 
sample from Schmerber. Before the 
Supreme Court, Schmerber argued 
that the extraction of blood violated 
the privilege against self-incrimimi­
tion. Rejecting this argument, the 
Court held that the privilege covers 
only communicative or testimonial 
evidence, not physical or real evi-
dence. According to the Court: 
' 
It is clear that the protection of 
the privilege reaches an accused's 
communications, whatever form 
they might take .... On the other 
hand, both federal and state courts 
have usually held that it offers no 
protection against compulsion to 
submit to fingerprinting, photo­
graphing, or measurements, to 
write or speak for identification, 
to appear in court, to stand, to 
assume a stance, to walk, or to 
make a particular gesture. The dis­
tinction which has emerged, often 
expressed in different ways, is that 
the privilege is a bar against com­
pelling "communications" or 
''testimony,'' but that compulsion 
which makes a suspect or accused 
the source of "real or physical 
evidence" does not violate it. 2
I 384 U. S. 75 7 (1966) . 
2 Id. at 763- 764 . 
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Subsequent Supreme Court cases 
reaffirmed the testimonial-physical 
evidence distinction. In Gilbert v. 
California, 3 the Court concluded that 
the compelled production of a ''mere 
handwriting exemplar, in contrast to 
the content of what is written, like the 
voice or body itself, is an identifying 
physical characteristic outside [the 
Fifth Amendment's] protection. "4 
Similarly, in United States v. Dionis­
io, 5 the Court ruled that compelling a 
defendant to speak for the purpose of 
voice analysis did not violate the Fifth 
Amendment because the "voice re­
cordings were to be used solely to . 
measure the physical properties of 
the witnesses' voices, not for the tes­
timonial or communicative content of 
what was to be said. "6 
In its most recent case on the sub­
ject, Pennsylvania v. Muniz/ the 
Court once again applied the 
Schmerber rule. Muniz was asked to 
perform a horizontal gaze nystagmus 
test, a "walk and turn" test, and a 
"one leg stand test." A videotape of 
his performance was shown at trial. 
The Court wrote: 
Under Schmerber and its progeny, 
. . . any slurring of speech and 
other evidence of lack of muscular 
J 388 u.s. 263 (1967). 
4 Id. at 266-267. Accord United States 
v. Euge, 444 U. S. 707, 718 (1980) 
("Compulsion of h andwriting exemplars 
. . .  [not]test imonial evidence protected 
by the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self incrimination") ;  United States v. 
Mara, 4 10 U. S. 19, 22 n. * (1973) (hand­
writing exemplars) .  
5 410 u.s. 1 (1973). 
6 ld. at 7. See also United Stat es v. 
Wade, 388 U. S. 2 18,  222 (1967) (com­
pelling an accused to exhibit his person 
for observation was compulsion "to ex­
h ibit h is physical characteristics, not 
compulsion to disclose any knowled ge h e  
might h ave") .  
7 496 U.S. 582 (1990) . 
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coordination revealed by Muniz's 
responses to Officer Hosterman's 
direct questions constitute nontes­
timonial components of those re­
sponses. Requiring a suspect to 
reveal the physical manner in 
which he articulates words, like 
requiring him to reveal the physi­
cal properties of the sound pro­
duced by his voice, see Dionisio 
. . . , does not, without more, com­
pel him to provide a ''testimonial'' 
response for purposes of the privi­
lege.8 
In contrast, Muniz's inability to an­
swer when requested to state the date 
of his sixth birthday amounted to a 
testimonial response and should have 
been excluded.9 
Under Schmerber, obtaining evi­
dence for most forensic techniques is 
free from Fifth Amendment concerns 
because t..hese techniques involve 
physical, not testimonial, eyidence. 
Thus, the lower courts have applied 
Schmerber to cases involving hand­
writing, 10 fingerprints, 11 voice exem­
plars, 12 dental impressions, 13 urine 
• ld . at 592 .  
9 When asked if h e  knew the d at e  
of h is sixth birthday, Muniz responded: 
''No, I don't. '' Id. at 586. 
10 E. g.,In re SpecialFed. Grand Jury, 
809 F.2d 1023 ,  102 7-1028 (3d Cir. 
198 7) (requiring backh and slant exem­
plars) ;  United States v. Rich ardson, 755 
F.2d 685, 685-686 (8th Cir. 198 5) .  
11 E. g. , In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 46 
(2d Cir. 1988) ; United States v. Tho­
mann, 609 F.2d 560, 562 (1st Cir. 19 79) .  
12 E. g., Burnett v. Collins, 982 F.2d 
922 (5th Cir. 1993) Oive voice exemplar 
in presence of jury) ; Fuller v. State, 8 58 
S.W.2d 528,  53 1-532 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1993) (trial court order requiring defen­
d ant t o  repeat words used by assailant for 
the purpose of voice identificat ion d oes 
not violate state constitut ion). 
13 E.g., United States v. Maceo, 8 73 
F .2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.) ( exa.TTJi..rmtion of 
t eeth) , cen. denied,493 U. S. 840(1989) . 
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samples, 14 gunshot residues, 15 and 
other techniques.16 
Nevertheless, the application of 
the Schmerber rule continues to pro­
voke disagreement in some situa­
tions. For example, in State v. 
Maze,17 the court ruled that "recita­
tion of the alphabet is not testimonial 
in that it does not require a suspect to 
coinrnunicate any personal beliefs or 
knowledge." 18 In contrast, in A llred 
v. State, 19 the Florida Supreme Court 
ruled that evidence of the defendant's 
incorrect recitation of the alphabet 
when stopped for driving under the 
influence violated the state constitu­
tion: ''Failure to accurately recite the 
alphabet 'discloses information' be­
yond possible slurred speech; it is the 
content (incorrect recitation) of the 
speech that is being introduced, rath­
er than merely the manner (slurring) 
of speech.' '20 
State Constitutions 
As Allred indicates, an accused 
may not have to rely on federal law. A 
state is always free to provide greater 
self-incrimination protection than is 
afforded by the Fifth Amendment. 
For example, passive submission 
14 E. g. ,  Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 
74, 80-81 (C. M. A. 1983); McKenna v. 
State, 671 S. W.2d 138,  1 39 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1984) . 
15 E. g. , State v. Ulrich ,  609 P.2d 
1218 ,  1222 (Mont. 1980) (gunsh ot resi­
due swabbings) ; Commonwealth v. Mo­
nahan, 549 A.2d 231 ,  23 5 (Pa. Super. 
1988) . 
16 E. g. ,  United States v. Dougall, 919 
F.2d 932 , 935 (5th Cir. 1 990) (hair sam­
ples) , cert. denied, 501 U. S. 1234 
(1991 ) ;  People v. Thomas, 22 5 Cal. 
Rptr. 277, 2 79 (Cal. App. 1986) (saliva, 
h air, and blood) . 
17 825 P.2d 1 169 (Kan. App. 1992). 
18 Id. at 1 1 73 .  
19 622 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1993) . 
20 ld. at 987. 
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while evidence is obtained does not 
violate the self-incrimination clause 
of the Georgia Constitution. Thus, 
fmgerprints could be compelled. 
However, compelled active partici­
pation, such as requiring a suspect to 
place a foot in a cast, is prohibited. 21 
Refusal to Submit to Intoxication 
Tests 
In South Dakota v. Neville, 22 the 
Supreme Court considered whether 
the admission into evidence of a de­
fendant's refusal to submit to a blood­
alcohol test violated the Fifth Amend­
ment. Instead of relying on the testi­
monial-physical evidence distinction, 
the Court rested its decision on differ­
ent grounds. Accordmg to the Court, 
refusal to take the test did not amount 
to ''compulsion'' within the meaning 
of the privilege: " [A] refusal to take 
a blood-�cohol test, after a police 
officer has lawfully requested it, is 
not an act coerced by the officer, and 
thus is not protected by the privilege 
against self-incrimination. "23 The 
Court explained that 
the respondent concedes, as he 
must, that the State could legiti­
mately compel the suspect, against 
his will, to accede to the test. Giv­
en, then, that the offer of taking a 
blood-alcohol test is clearly legiti­
mate, the action becomes no less 
legitimate when the State offers a 
21 Creamer v. State, 192 S.E.2d 350 
(Ga. 1972) (surgical removal of bullet; 
Georgia Constitution provides greater 
self-incrimination protection than U.S. 
Constitution) , cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 
975 (1973); Green v. State, 398 S.E.2d 
360, 362 (Ga. 1990) ("[T]lie use of a 
substance naturally excreted by the hu­
man body [urine] d oes not violate a defen­
d ant's right  against self-incrimination un­
der the Georgia Const itution. ") ,  cen. 
denied, 500 U.S. 93 5 (1991) .  
2 2  459 u.s. 553 (1983). 
23 Id. at 564. 
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second option of refusing the test, 
with the attendant penalties for 
making the choice. 24 
A number of courts have reached 
the same result on state constitutional 
grounds.25 The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts, however, 
has reached a different conclusion 
under its constitution. That court has 
written: 
It does not logically follow, how­
ever, that, because test results are 
not testimonial, refusal evidence 
falls in the same category. fu the 
ordinary case a prosecutor would 
seek to introduce refusal evidence 
to show, and would argue if per­
mitted, that a defendant's refusal 
is the equivalent of his statement, 
''I have had so much to drink that 
I !mow or at !east suspect that I am 
unable to pass the test. " . . . 
[I]f refusal evidence has rele­
vance to any issue essential to the 
prosecution's case, it is because 
it is reflective of t.�e lmowledge, 
understanding, and thought pro­
cess of the accused. 26 
Consequently, evidence of refusal to 
take a breathalyzer test violates the 
state self-incrimination clause. In a 
later case, the same court ruled that 
evidence of a defendant's refusal to 
submit to a gunshot residue test also 
2'1 Id. at 5 63. 
25 E. g. , Cox v. People, 735 P .2d 153, 
157 (Colo. 1987); McDonnell v. Comm'r 
of Pub. Safety, 473 N. W. 2d 848, 855 
(Minn. 1991); State v. Hoenscheid, 374 
N. W. 2d 128, 129-130 (S.D. 1985). 
26 Opinion of the Justices to the Sen­
ate, 591 N.E. 2d 1073, 1077-1078 (Mass. 
1992). The Massachusetts Constitution 
contains an additional clause; it prohibits 
compelling a person to ''furnish evidence 
against himself. ' '  The Court has ruled 
that this provision requires a ''broader 
interpretation" than that of the Fifth 
Amendment. Id. at 1078. 
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violated the state constitution: ''Kf 
the fact that the defendant refused to 
allow the hand-swabbing demon­
strates consciousness of guilt, such 
refusal rises to the level of a self­
accusation.' '27 
Polygraph Examinations 
Some types of forensic techniques, 
however, . may implicate Fifth 
Amendment issues. As the Supreme 
Court has noted, the ''distinction be­
tween real or physical evidence, on 
the one hand, and co:rnmunications or 
testimony, on the other, is not readily 
drawn in many cases.' '28 Polygraph 
testing is an example. 29 The Court in 
Schmerber commented on the Fifth 
Amendment aspects of polygraph ex­
aminations: 
Some tests seemingly directed to 
obtain ''physical evidence,'' for 
example, lie detector tests measur­
ing changes in body function dur­
ing interrogation, may actually be 
directed to eliciting responses 
which are essentially testimonia!. 
To compel a person to submit to 
iesting in which an effort will be 
made to determine his guilt or in­
nocence on the basis of physiologi­
cal responses, whether willed or 
not, is to evoke the spirit and histo­
ry of the Fifth Amendment. 30 
Courts that have admitted polygraph 
evidence have recognized the appli­
cability of the privilege in this con­
text. 31 
27 Commonwealth v .  Lydon, 597 
N.E. 2d 36, 40 (Mass. 1992). See also 
State v. Denney, 536 A. 2d 1242, 1245 
(N. H. 1987) (admission of defendant' s  
refusal without first warning him violates 
state due process). 
211 South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 
553, 561 (1983). 
29 Id. at 561 n . 12. 
30 384 U.S. at 764. 
31 E.g., Commonwealth v. A Juve­
nile, 313 N. E.2d 120, 127 (Mass. 1974) 
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Right to Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees 
an accused the right to counsel. This 
. nght has not been limited to trial 
but has been extended, under some 
circumstances, to identification pro­
cedures32 and interrogations. 33 Al­
though defendants have argued that 
the right to counsel also applies when 
evidence is obtained from them for 
'scientific analysis, this argument has 
failed for two reasons. 
Attachment of Rig ht 
First, the Supreme Court has held 
that the right to counsel attaches only 
after the ''initiation of adversary judi­
cial criminal proceedings-whether 
by way of formal charge, preliminary 
hearing, indictment, information, or 
arraignment.' '34 An arrest, by itself, 
does not trigger the right to counsel. 
Frequently, evidence that is sub­
mitted for scientific analysis has been 
obtained from defenda.ilts during the 
investigatory stage, prior to com­
mencement of formal criminal pro­
ceedings, and thus before the time 
when the right to counsel attaches. 
Cases involving swabbing for gun­
shot residues35 and the taking of teeth 
impressions36 have been decided on 
(''The polygraph results are essentially 
testimonial in nature and therefore a de­
fendant could not be compelled initially 
to take such an examination on the Com­
monwealth 's motion.'') . 
32 See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682 
(19 72) ; United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 
2 18 (1967) .  
33 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 
387 (1977) ;  Massiah v. United States, 
3 77 u.s. 201 (1964) . 
34 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 
(1972) . 
35 State v. Ulrich ,  609 P.2d 12 18 
(Mont. 1980) (gunsh ot residue swab­
bings taken before right  to counsel 
attached) . 
36 Spence v. State, 795 S. W.2d 743 , 
752-753 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en 
this basis. Sinlilarly, a person arrest­
ed for driving while intoxicated does 
not have a federal constitutional right 
to counsel when deciding whether to 
take a blood-alcohol test. 37 In some 
jurisdictions, however, a right to 
"consult" counsel may be guaran­
teed by state law. 38 
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Critical Stages 
The right to counsel often does not 
apply for a second reason. Neither the 
obtaining of evidence for scientific 
analysis nor the analysis itself is a 
"critical" stage within the meaning 
of the Sixth Amendment. 
In United States v. Wade,39 the 
Supreme Court held that the right to 
counsel applied to lineup identifica­
tions. According to the Court, a line­
up presents ''grave potential for prej­
udice . . . which may not be capable 
of reconstruction at trial, and [the] 
presence of counsel itself can often 
avert prejudice and assure a meaning­
ful confrontation at trial. "40 The 
Court, however, distinguished eye­
witness identification procedures 
from the scientific analysis of physi­
cal evidence: 
The Government characterizes the 
lineup as a mere preparatory step 
in the gathering of the prosecu­
tion's evidence, not different-for 
bane) (teeth impressions taken before 
righ t  to counsel attached) ,  cert. denied, 
499 u.s. 932 (1991) . 
37 See State v: Cich owski, 523 A.2d 
503 , 506 (Conn. 1987) ;  Brank v. State, 
528 A.2d 118 5, 1190 (Del. 198 7) (no due 
process righ t  to consult attorney) . 
38 E. g. , Whiseh unt v. State, 746 P.2d 
1298, 1298 (Alaska 1987) (statutory 
right) ;  Friedman v. Comm'r of Pub. 
Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 ,  832 (Minn. 
1991) (state constitution) ; State v. Gar­
vey, 595 A.2d 267, 268 (Vt. 199 1) (statu­
tory right) .  
29 388 U. S. 2 18 (1967). 
40 Id. at 236 . 
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Sixth Amendment purposes-from 
various other preparatory steps, 
such as systemized or scientific 
analyzing of the accused's fmger­
prints, blood sample, clothing, 
hair, and the like. We think there 
are differences which preclude 
such stages being characterized as 
critical stages at t,Vhicp t:he acc;:l!��d 
has the right to the presence of his 
counsel. Knowledge of the tech­
niques of science and technology 
is sufficiently available, and the 
variables in techniques few 
enough, that the accused has the 
opportunity for a meaningful con­
frontation . of the Government's 
case at trial through the ordinary 
processes of cross-examination of 
Government's expert witnesses 
and the presentation of the evi­
dence of his own experts. The de­
nial of a right to have his counsel 
present at such analyses does not 
therefore violate the Sixth Amend­
ment; they are not critical stages 
since there is minimal risk that his 
counsel's absence at such stages 
might derogate from his right to a 
fair trial. 41 
In a companion case, Gilbert v. 
California, 42 the defendant contended 
that his right to counsel had been 
violated when he was compelled to 
provide handwriting exemplars in the 
absence of an attorney. Whereas 
Wade focused on the time of labora­
tory analysis, Gilbert focused on the 
time the evidence is obtained from 
the suspect. Nevertheless, the result 
was the same; the right to counsel did 
not apply. The Court in Gilbert found 
significant differences between con­
ducting a lineup and obtaining exem­
plars: 
The taking of the exemplars was 
not a "critical" stage of the crimi-
41 ld . at 22 7-228 .  
42 388 u.s. 263 (196 7) . 
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nal proceedings entitling petitioner 
to the assistance of counsel. . . . 
[T]here is minimal risk that the 
absence of counsel might derogate 
from his right to a fair trial. . . . 
If, for some reason, an unrepresen­
tative exemplar is taken, this can 
be brought out and corrected 
through the advers�ry processat 
trial since the accused can make 
an unlimited number of additional 
exemplars for analysis and com­
parison by government and de­
fense handwriting experts. Thus, 
"the accused has the opportunity 
for a meaningful confrontation of 
the [State's] ca�e· at trial through 
the ordinary processes of cross­
examination of the [State's] expert 
[handwriting] witnesses and the 
presentation of the evidenc� of his 
own [handwriting] experts. "43 
Hence, unlike eyewitness identifi-
cation procedures, the adversary pro­
cess is thought to afford a criminal 
defendant an adequate opportunity to 
confront and challenge scientific evi­
dence. Moreover, as one court has 
remarked: "Not only is the taking of 
the exemplars not at a critical stage 
of the proceedings entitling an ac­
cused to the assistance of counsel, but 
Appellant has pointed to no function 
counsel could perform, were he pres­
ent, save the futile advice not to give 
the sample.' '44 
Accordingly, courts have held 
the right to counsel does not apply 
when gunshot residues,45 fmger-
43 Id. at 267. Accord United States v. 
Euge, 444 U. S. 70 7, 718 (1980) (hand­
writing exemplars) ; United States v. Ash, 
413 U. S. 300, 3 18 n.IO (19 73) (ph oto­
graphic identifications).  
44 Lewis v .  United States, 382 F.2d 
817, 819 (D. C. Cir.) (hand writing exem­
plars) , cen. denied, 389 U. S. 962 (1967) . 
45 E.g. , State v. Od om, 2 77 S.E.2d 
3 52,  3 55 (N. C.) ,  cen. denied, 454 U.S. 
1052 (1981) ;  People v. Mullings, 488 
N.Y. S.2d 36,37 (A.D. 1985) . 
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prints,46 palmprints,47 blood,48 hair ,49 
and other types of evidence50 are ob­
tained from suspects. In a recent case, 
the Washington Supreme Court noted 
that • 'the taking of nontestimonial 
physical evidence [blood for DNA 
testing] is not usually a critical stage 
at which the right to counsel atta­
ches. "51 
Search and Seizure 
. The Fourth Amendment guaran­
tees the right to be free from unrea­
sonable governmental searches and 
seizures. In some cases, evidence that 
may be subjected to scientific analysis 
is seized from a specific location. 52 
46 E. g. , Ward v. United States, 486 
F. 2d 305, 306 ( 5th Cir. 1973), cert. de­
nied, 416 U. S. 990 (1974) ; United States 
v. McNeal, 463 F.2d 1 180, 1 1 81 ( 5th 
Cir. 1972). 
47 E. g. ,  United States v. Sanders, 4 77 
F.2d 1 12, 1 13 ( 5th Cir. ),  cert. denied, 
414 U. S. 870 ( 1973) ; State v. Jones, 467 
So. 2d 147, 149- 1 50 (La. App. 1985) .  
48 E. g. , Sch merber v. California, 384 
u.s. 757,765-766 (1966) . 
49 E. g., United States v. Jackson, 448 
F.2d 963 , 9 71 (9 th Cir. 1971), cert. de­
nied, 405 U. S. 924 ( 19 72); Henry v. 
United States, 432 F.2d 1 14, 1 19 (9 th 
Cir. 1970) , cert. denied, 400 U. S. 101 1 
( 1971) .  
5{) E. g., United States v.  Maceo, 873 
F .2d 1 ,  4-5 ( 1 st Cir.) ( examination of 
teeth) , cen. denied, 493 U. S. 840 (1989) ; 
United States v. Kim, 577 F.2d 4 73, 
481 (9th Cir. 1978) (voice identification) ; 
United States v. Love, 482 F.2d 213, 216 
(5th Cir.) ( bomb nitrate swabbings) , cen. 
denied, 414 U. S. 1026 ( 1973). 
51 State v. Kalakosky, 852 P.2d 1064, 
1069 (Wash . 1993). 
52 E. g. ,  Cardwell v. Lewis, 41 7 U. S. 
583 (1974) ( seizure of suspect's car for 
paint chip and tire mark comparison) ; 
Coolidge v. New Hampsh ire, 403 U. S. 
443 (1971) ( seizure of suspect's car to 
search for evidence such as h air and parti­
cles that were later analyzed by neutron 
activation analysis). 
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In other situations, the evidence is 
seized from a suspect. The cases in­
volving the latter situation are dis­
cussed here. 
Typically, there are two distinct 
Fourth Amendment issues raised 
when physical evidence is obtained 
from a suspect for the purpose of 
scientific analysis. First, there is a 
"seizure" of the person that brings 
the suspect under the control of the 
police. Second, there is a subsequent 
search anc:!. seizure of physical charac­
teristics , biological specimens, or 
trace evidence from the seized 
personY 
Seizure of the Person 
Before trace evidence or physical 
characteristics can be obtained from 
a suspect, the suspect must either 
consent or be detained under some 
form of government control. Such 
control raises the question whether 
the person has been "seized" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amend­
ment. Evidence submitted for scien­
tific analysis has been collected from 
suspects (1) at the time of arrest; 
(2) during pretrial incarceration; (3) 
during detention on less than proba­
ble cause; and (4) pursuant to grand 
jury subpoenas and administrative 
summonses. If the initial seizure of 
the person violates Fourth Amend­
ment requirements, evidence from 
the subsequent search of that person 
may be excluded at trial as ''fruit of 
the poisonous tree." 
5 3  As the Court h as noted: "[T]he ob­
taining of physical evidence from a per­
son involves a potential Fourth Amend­
ment violation at two different levels­
the 'seizure' of the 'person' necessary to 
bring h im into contact with government 
agents . . . and the subsequent search for 
and seizure of the evidence. " United 
States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1 ,  8 ( 1973) 
( voice exemplar) . 
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Arrest 
Generally, if the arrest is valid, the 
seizure of physical evidence from the 
person incident to the arrest is also 
valid. While the arrest of a person in 
a public place does not require the 
issuance of an arrest warrant, 54 it does 
require probable cause that a crime 
has been committed by the arrestee. 
For example, the Court addressed the 
constitutionality of the initial seizure 
(the arrest) before turning to the 
Fourth Amendment implications of 
withdrawing blood from Schmer­
ber. 55 The Court held that probable 
cause for the arrest existed based on 
the arresting officer's observation of 
the defendant at both the scene of the 
accident and at the hospital. 
In Davis v. Mississippi,56 the Court 
considered the constitutionality of a 
detention during which fmgerprir1ts 
were obtained from Davis. Although 
fmgerprints were found on the win­
dow used by an assailai1t to gain entry 
into a rape victim's house, the victim 
could not provide any description of 
her attacker other than his race and 
approximate age. The police con­
ducted a dragnet procedure in which 
numerous young blacks, including 
Davis, were detained and fingerprint­
ed. The Court ruled that the deten­
tion, based neither on probable cause 
nor a warrant, was illegal. Conse­
quently, the fingerprint evidence was 
suppressed. 
Detention on Less Than Probable 
Cause � 
In Terry v. Ohio,S7 the Supreme 
Court first recognized that the deten­
tion of a suspect on less than probable 
54 United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 
41 1 (1976). 
55 Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 
757, 768 -771 (1966). 
56 394 U. S. 72 1(1969) . 
57 392 U.S. I (1968). 
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cause may satisfy Fourth Amendment 
requirements. The Terry standard has 
come to be known as the ''reasonable 
suspicion" test. The importance of 
Terry and its progeny, defining the 
scope of the "stop and frisk" doc­
trine, to the collection of physical 
evidence for the purpose of scientific 
analysis turns on dictum in Davis v. 
Mississippi. As noted preYiously, the 
Court in Davis held the detention of 
a suspect on less than probable cause, 
during which fmgerprints were ob­
tained, unconstitutional. However, 
the Court commented: 
Detentions for the sole purpose of 
obtaining fmgerprints are no less 
subject to the constraints of the 
Fourth Amendment. It is arguable, 
however, that, because of the 
unique nature of the fmgerprinting 
process, such detentions might, 
under narrowly defined circum­
stances, be found to comply with 
the Fourth Amendment even 
though there is no probable cause 
in the traditional sense .... Deten­
tion for fmgerprinting may consti­
tute a much less serious intrusion 
upon personal security than other 
types of police searches and deten­
tions. Fingerprinting involves 
none of the probing into an individ­
ual's private life and thoughts that 
marks an interrogation or search. 
Nor can fingerprint detention be 
employed repeatedly to harass any 
individual, since the police need 
only one set of each person's 
prints. Furthermore, fmgerprint­
ing is an inherently more reliable 
and effective crime solving tool 
than eyewitness identifications or 
confessions and is not subject to 
such abuses as the improper lineup 
and the ''third degree.'  Finally, 
because there is no danger of de­
struction of fingerprints, the limit­
ed detention need not come unex­
pectedly or at an inconvenient 
time. For this same reason, the 
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general requirement that the autho­
rization of a judicial officer be ob­
tained in advance of detention 
would seem not to adrrrit of any 
exception in the fmgerprinting 
context. 58 
As a result of this dictum, a number 
of statutes and court rules providing 
for· de,_tention on less than probable 
cause for the purpose of nontestimo­
nial identification procedures have 
been adopted59 or proposed.60 For ex­
ample, an Arizona statute provides 
for the issuance of judicial orders for 
obtaining "fingerprints, palm prints, 
footprints, measurements, handwrit­
ing, handprinting, sound of voice, 
blood samples, urine sampes, saliva 
samples, hair samples, comparative 
personal appearance, or photographs 
of an individual.' '61 Such an order 
may be issued if the following condi­
tions are satisfied: 
I 
1. Reasonable cause for belief that 
a specifically described crimi­
nal offense punishable by at 
least one year in the state prison 
has been committed. 
58 Davis, 394 U.S. at 727-728. The 
Court then commented: "We have no 
occasion in this case, however, to deter­
mine whether the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment could be met by nar­
rowly circumscribed procedures for ob­
taining, during the course of a criminal 
investigation, the fingerprints of individ­
uals for whom there is no probable cause 
to arrest .... " Id. at 728. 
59 E.g., Colo. R. Crim. P. 41.1; Neb. 
Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3301-29-3307 (1989); 
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-271-15A-282 
(1991); Vt. R. Crim. P. 41.1. 
60 Model Code of Pre-Arraignment 
Procedure art. 170 (Proposed Official 
Draft 1975); Unif. R. Crim. P. 436 (Ap­
proved Draft 1974); Fed. R. Crim. P. 
41.1 (Proposed Draft), 52 F.R.D. 462 
(1971). 
61 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3905( D) 
(1989). 
2. Procurement of evidence of 
identifying physical character­
istics from an identified or par­
ticularly described individual 
may contribute to the identifica­
tion of the individual who com­
mitted such offense. 
3. Such evidence cannot other­
wise be obtained by the investi­
gating officer from either the 
law enforcement agency em­
ploying the affiant or the crimi­
nal identification division of the 
Arizona department of public 
safety.62 
The Arizona courts have upheld the 
constitutionality of this provision. 63 
Similarly, the Colorado rule on non­
testimonial identification procedures 
also has been upheld. 64 
Unlike other provisions, the Ari­
zona statute does not specify the 
quantum of evidence required to sub­
ject a person to such an order. In 
contrast, an Idaho statute provides 
that a nontestimonial identification 
order may be issued if "[r]easonable 
grounds exist, which may or may not 
amount to probable cause, to believe 
that the . . . individual committed the 
criminal offense. "65 
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62 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 13-3905(A) 
(1989). 
63 See State v. Via, 704 P.2d 238 
(Ariz. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 
(1986); State v. Grijalva, 533 P.2d 533 
(Ariz.) (en bane) (photographs, finger­
prints, and hair samples), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 873 (1975). 
64 See People v. Davis, 669 P.2d 130, 
133-135 ( Colo. 1983) (nontestimonial 
order for photographs, fingerprints, and 
voice exemplar based on informant's tip 
upheld); People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18, 
31-32 (Colo. 1981) (en bane) (handwrit­
ing exemplars). 
65 Idaho Code § 19-625(B) (1987). 
See also Colo. R. Crim. P. 41.1(c)(2) 
("reasonable grounds, not amounting to 
probable cause to arrest, to suspect that 
the person ... committed the offense"). 
CRIMINAl lAW BULlETIN 
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet 
to decide the constitutionality of such 
provisions. Jln Hayes v. Florida, 66 
however, the Court noted that it had 
"not abandon[ed] the suggestion in 
Davis . . . that under circumscribed 
procedures, the Fourth _A_rnendment 
rnjght permit the judiciary to autho­
rize the seizure of a person on less 
than probable cause and his removal 
to the police station for the purpose 
of fingerprinting.' '67 The Court also 
noted that the state courts were divid­
ed on this issue. Some courts have 
refused to uphold the issuance of such 
orders, 68 while other courts have 
sanctioned their use:69 Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court strongly suggest­
ed that "a brief detention in the field 
for the purpose of fingerprinting,'' 
based on reasonable spspicion, would 
be constitutional. 70 0 
The dictum in Davis and Haves. 
however, was lii1Uted to fingetp;int� 
ing, which the Court emphasized was 
not an intrusive procedure. The issu­
ance of nontestimonial identification 
orders for more intrusive procedures, 
such as the extraction of blood, may 
conflict with Schmerber in which the 
Court required a more demanding 
standard. 71 
66 470U.S. 811 (1985). 
67 Id. at 817. 
6' See In re September 1981 Term 
Grand Jury, 432 N.E.2d 625, 630 (Ill. 
App. 1982) (probable cause required for 
blood and hair samples); State v. Evans, 
338 N.W.2d 788, 794(Neb. l983)(prob­
able cause required for fingerprints and 
palmprints). 
69 See Wise v. Murphy, 275 A. 2d 205, 
213-216 (D.C. 197l)(en banc)(lineups); 
State v. Hall, 461 A.2d 1155, 1160 
(N.J.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 
(1983). 
70 470 U.S. at 816. 
71 See People v. Marshall, 244 
N.W.2d 451, 456 (Mich. App. 1976) 
(' 'l'Jo judicial precedent was found, how­
ever, which sanctioned the use of a court 
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Grand Jury Subpoenas 
Another method by which evi­
dence may be obtained from a suspect 
is the grand jury. Kn United States v. 
Dionisio, 72 the defendant challenged 
the use of a grand jury subpoena to 
obtain voice exemplars, arguing that 
an appearance before a grand jury 
pursuant to a subpoena was a "sei­
zure,, of the person within the mean­
ing of the Fourth Amendment. The 
Supreme Court rejected this argu­
ment, holding that the "compulsion 
exerted by a grand jury subpoena 
differs from u'ie seizure effected by 
an arrest or even an i.Jnvestigative 
'stop. ' "73 
The latter is abrupt, is effected 
with force or the threat of it and 
often in demeaning circumstances, 
and, in the case of arrest, results 
in a record involving social stigma. 
A subpoena is served in the same 
manner as other legal process; it 
involves no stigma whatever; if the 
time for appearance is inconve­
nient, this can generally be altered; 
and it remains at all times under 
the control and supervision of a 
court. 74 
In short, since the Fourth Amend­
ment is not implicated, requirements 
such as probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion rlo not apply, Courts have 
upheld the use of a grand jury subpoe­
na for obtaining hai1dwritii1g exem-
order on less than probable cause in order 
to take blood samples from a suspect's 
person. Indeed, the constitutionality of 
such a procedme appears doubtful in light 
of Schmerber v. California. ''). 
72 410 U.S. 1 (1973). 
73 Id. at 10. 
74 Id. See also United States v. Euge, 
444 U.S. 707 (1980) (Internal Revenue 
Service statutorily authorized to issue 
sum.i1mnses compeiiing a taxpayer to pro­
vide handwriting exemplars). 
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plars, 75 fingerprints, 76 and hair sam­
ples77 as well as other evidence of 
identification. 78 
The use of a grand jury subpoena 
to obtain blood samples, however, 
presents a different question. Such an 
under-the-skin intrusion raises signif­
icant Fourth Amendment issues. One 
federal district court has ruled that a 
grand jury subpoena for blood and 
saliva samples must be based on rea­
sonable suspicion. 79 Another district 
court disagreed, holding that the use 
of a subpoena for this purpose is 
improper; a warrant based upon 
probable cause is required. Ac­
cording to this court, ''[t]o allow the 
United States to use a Rule 17(c) 
subpoena for this purpose would ab­
rogate T.S.'s Fourth Amendment 
rights and, thus, transform the sub­
poena into an instrument by which an 
illegal search and seizure is effectu­
ated. ''80 
Several state courts have also 
addressed this issue. After holding 
that the state constitution provides 
greater protection than its federal 
15 E.g. , United States v. Mara, 410 
U. S. 19, 21-22 (1973) ; United States v. 
Richardson, 755 F.2d 685, 685-686 (8th 
Cir. 1985).  
7 6  E.g. , In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Schofield), 507 F.2d 963, 967 (3d Cir.) ,  
cen. denied, 421 U.S. 101 5 (1975) .  See 
also In re Melvin, 550 F.2d 674,677 (1 st 
Cir. 1977) . 
77 E. g. , In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Mills) ,  686 F .2d 1 3 5, 1 39 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1020 (1982). 
78 E. g. , United States v. Ferri, 778 
F.2d 985, 995-996 (3d Cir. 1985) (shoe 
and foot prints) ,  cen. denied, 416 U. S. 
1 1 72 (1986) ; In re Grand Jury Proceed ­
ings (Hellman) , 756 F.2d 428, 431 (6th 
Cir. 1985) (voice exemplar) .  
79 Henry v. Ryan, 775 F. Supp. 247 
(N.D. TIL 1 991) .  
80 In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(T. S.) ,  816 F. Supp. 1 196, 1205 (W.D. 
Ky. 1993). 
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counterpart, the lllinois Supreme 
court examined a subpoena that re­
quired blood, head and pubic hair, 
and fmger and palm prints. The Court 
ruled that ''some showing of individ­
ualized suspicion as well as relevance 
must be made before physical evi­
dence of a noninvasive nature, such 
as an in-person appearance in a lineup 
or fmgerprinting, is demanded of a 
witness. This may be done through an 
affidavit by the State's Attorney. "81 
Pubic hair samples, however, are dif­
ferent. They come from ''the most 
private part of the human body'' and 
''represent a considerable intrusion 
into personal privacy.' '82 According­
ly, probable cause and a warrant are 
required. Head hairs also raise priva­
cy concerns. While the color and tex­
ture of the hair is readily observable, 
an ''individual does not ordinarily 
have the expectation that others will 
cut, pull or comb his hair without his 
permission. "83 Thus, the probable 
cause requirement similarly applies 
here. 
In addition, the Oklahoma Court 
of Criminal Appeals has held as a 
matter of state law that a grand jury 
subpoena for blood samples requires 
probable cause and a subpoena for 
fmger and palm prints requires a rea­
sonable and individualized suspi­
cion.84 
Search and Seizure of Physical 
Evidence 
Even if a suspect's detention is 
constitutionally permissible, the 
question remains whether the search 
and seizure of evidence from that 
81 In re May 1991 Will County Grand 
Jury, 604 N.E.2d 929, 93 5-936 (TIL 
1992) . 
82 ld. 
83 ld. at 938. 
84 Woolverton v.  Multicounty Grand 
Jury, 859 P.2d 1 1 12 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1993). 
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person is also permissible. The initial 
inquiry is whether l:here is, i.I(')fact, 
a search within the meat11ing of the 
Fourth Amendment. If there is a 
''search,'' the next question is wheth­
er the search complies with Fourth 
Amendment constraints, such as tl1e 
warrant and probable cause require­
ments. 85 
Physical Characteristics 
The leading case defming which 
governmental activities are 
''searches'' within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment is Katz v. United 
States. 86 Katz substituted a privacy 
approach for the traditional property 
approach to this issue. According to 
the Court: 
'' [T]he Fourth Amendment pro­
tects people, not places. V\lhat a 
person lrnowi.ngly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection. . . . But 
what he seeks to preserve as pri­
vate, even in an area accessible to 
the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.' '87 
The Katz rationale played a major 
role in two cases that involved the 
compelled production of voice and 
handwriting exemplars by means of 
a grand jury subpoena. In United 
States v. Dionisio, 38 after ruling that 
the compelled appearance of a person 
before a grand jury was not a "sei-
"' If a suspect consents, neither a war­
rant nor probable cause is required. How­
ever, the consent must be valid. See 
Graves v. Beto, 301 F. Supp. 264, 266 
(E.D. Tex. 1969) (consent not valid 
where defendant deceived as to purpose 
of blood test), aff'd, 424 F.2d 524, 525 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 960 
(1970). 
36 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
37 Id. at 351. 
DB 410 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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zme" within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court con­
sidered whether the taking of a voice 
exemplar itself constituted a search: 
The physical cha:racteristics of a 
person's voice, its tone and man­
ner, as opposed to t.�e content of a 
specific conversation, are con­
stantly exposed to the-public. Like 
a man's facial characteristics, or 
handwriting, his voice is repeat­
edly produced for others to hear. 
No person can have a reasonable 
expectation that others wil! not 
lmow the sound of his voice, any 
more than he can reasonably ex­
pect that his face will be a mystery 
to the world. 39 
Accordingly, there was no search. 
L11 United States v. Mara,90 the 
Courl reached the same conclusion 
with respect to handwriting: "Hand­
writing, like speech, is repeatedly 
shown to the public, and ti-}ere is no 
more expectation of privacy in the 
physical characteristics of a person's 
script than there is in the tone of his 
voice. "91 
Invasive Procedures 
All evidence of physical character­
istics, however, is not beyond Fourth 
Amendment protection. In Schmer­
ber, decided before Dionisio, the 
Court held that the extraction of blood 
for the purpose of scientific analysis 
"plainly constitute[s] searches of 
'persons' "92 within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment. In Dionisio, 
the Court distinguished, rather than 
39 Id. at 14. 
YO 410 u.s. 19 (1973). 
91 Id. at 21. Accord United States v. 
Euge, 444 U.S. 707,718 (1980) ("Com­
pulsion of handwriting exemplars is nei­
ther a search or seizure subject to Fourth 
Amendment protections . . . . " ). 
92 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 767 (1966). 
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overruled, Schmerber: "The re­
quired disclosure of a person's voice 
is thus immeasurably further re­
moved from the Fourth Amendment 
protection than was the intrusion into 
the body effected by the blood extrac­
tion in Schmerber. "93 
The difference between Dionsio 
and Schmerber turns on the bodily 
intrusion involved in the extraction of 
blood samples. In Skinner v. Railway 
lAbor Executives' Ass'n ,94 the Court 
wrote that "it is obvious that this 
physical intrusion, penetrating be­
neath the skin, infringes an expecta­
tion of privacy that society is pre­
pared to recognize as reasonable. "95 
In addition, an ensuing chemical 
analysis of the blood sample to obtain 
physiological data ''is a further inva­
sion" of privacy interests.% Under 
this view, the analysis of breath to 
determine intoxication ''implicates 
similar concerns about bodily integri­
ty" and thus constitutes a search.97 
The Court in Skinner also consid­
ered the collection of urine samples. 
Even though this procedure does not 
involve a bodily intrusion, the Court 
held that it was a search. Like blood, 
the chemical analysis of urine can 
"reveal a host of private medical 
facts," including whether a person 
is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. 
Moreover, the manner of collection, 
which may involve visual or aural 
monitoring of urination, "itself im­
plicates privacy interests. ''98 
93 410 U.S. at 14. 
94 489 u.s. 602 (1989) . 
95 ld. at 6 16.  
9 6  ld. 
97 ld. at 6 16-617. See also Burnett  v. 
Anchorage, 806 F:2d 1447, 1449 (9th 
Cir. 1986) ("[T]he administration of a 
breath test is a search with in the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. . . .  ") .  
98 489 U.S. at 617. See also Forbes v. 
Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 3 12 (7th Cir. 1992) 
("Urine tests are searches for Fourth 
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In another case, Cupp v. Murphy, 99 
th� �ourt considered the legality of 
seiZmg fingernail scrapings from a 
suspect. After fmding that the defen­
dant had been detained on probable 
cause, thtf Court stated: 
The inquiry does not end here, 
however, because Murphy was 
subjected to a search as well as a 
seizure of his person. Unlike the 
fmgerprinting in Davis, the voice 
exemplar obtained in United States 
v. Dionisio ... , or the handwrit­
ing exemplar obtained in United 
States v. Mara . . . , the search of 
the respondent's fingernails went 
beyond mere ''physical character­
istics . . . constantly exposed to 
the public.'' United States v. Dio­
nisio . . . , and constituted the type 
of ''severe, though brief, intrusion 
upon cherished personal security' ' 
that is subject to constitutional 
scrutiny. 100 
In sum, any procedure more intru­
sive than the obtaining of fmger­
prints, voice, or handwriting exem­
plars implicates the Fourth 
Amendment. Taking shoe prints, 101 . . th 102 examm g tee , and inspecting 
hands under ultraviolet light103 are 
Amendment purposes.") ,  cert. denied, 
113 S. Ct. 1362 ( 1993). 
99 412 U.S. 291 (1973) . 
100 ld. at 295. 
101 See United States v. Ferri, 778 
F.2d 985, 995-996 (3d Cir. 198 5) ,  cert. 
denied, 476 U.S. 1172 ( 1986). 
102 See United States v. Holland ,  3 78 
F. Supp. 144 ,  154 (E.D. Pa.) (dental 
examination not a search), aff'd, 506 
F.2d 1050 (3 d Cir. 1974) , ce11. denied, 
420 u.s. 994 ( 1975) .  
103 See United States v. Kenaan, 496 
F.2d 181, 182-183 (1st Cir. 1974) ; but 
see People v. Santistevan, 715 P.2d 792 ,  
795 (Colo.) ( ultraviolet inspection of 
h and s a search),  cert. denied, 4 79 U. S. 
965 ( 1986). 
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not considered searches. In contrast, 
taking hair samples generally has 
been characterized as a search. 104 
Searches Incident to Arrest 
One of the major exceptions to 
the warrant requirement is the search 
incident to arrest doctrine. 105 In Cupp 
v. Murphy, 106 the Court upheld the 
seizure of fmgernail sctapifigifunder 
this doctrine. During the voluntary 
stationhouse questioning of Murphy 
about his wife's strangulation mur­
der, the police observed a dark spot 
on his fmger, which they believed to 
be blood. Despite Murphy's protests; 
fingernail scrapings were taken. The 
scrapings contained traces of skill and 
blood as well as fabric from the vic­
tim's garments. The facts of Murphy 
are somewhat unusual because the 
defendant was not formally placed 
under arrest at the time the scrapings 
were removed. Nevertheless, the 
Court assumed probable cause for an 
arrest existed and held that the search 
incident to arrest justified the "very 
limited search necessary to preserve 
the highly evanescent evidence they 
found under his fmgernails. '' 107 
In United States v. Edwards, 108 the 
defendant was arrested at night and 
104 E.g. , Bouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d 
548,  550 (9th Cir. 1977) ; In re May 1991 
· Will County Grand Jury, 604 N.E.2d 
929, 93 5-938 ( Ill. 1992) (both pubic and 
head h air protected by state constitution) . 
But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Mills) , 686 F.2d 13 5, 139 (3d Cir. ) 
( seizure of facial and h ead h air not a 
search) , cert. denied, 4 59 U.S. 1020 
( 1982) . 
105 Under this exception, once a sus­
pect has been arrested based on probable 
cause, a search of the arrestee's person 
and the area within h is immediate control 
is permitted . Chime} v. California, 3 95 
u.s. 752 ( 1969) . 
l(lo 412 u.s. 291 (1973) . 
107 Id . at 296. 
108 415 u.s. 800 ( 19 74) . 
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then incarcerated in a local jail for 
attempting to break into a post office. 
Paint chips were found at the crime 
scene. The following moriling, the 
police seized the defendant's clothes. 
Examination of these garments dis­
closed paint chips that matched those 
found at the crime scene. The Su­
preme Court held that the delayed 
search of the clothing was constitu­
tional, notwithstanding the absence 
of a warrant. According to the Court, 
the established rule is that: 
[O]nce the accused is lawfully ar­
restd and is in custody, the effects 
in his possession at the place of 
detention that were subject to 
search at the time and place of his 
arrest may lawfully be searched 
and seized without a warrant even 
though a substantial period of time 
has elapsed between the arrest and 
subsequent administrative pro­
cessing, on the one hand, and the 
taking of the property for qse as 
evidence, on the other. This is true 
where the clothing or effects are 
immediately seized upon arrival at 
the jail, held under the defen<jant's 
name in the "property room" 'of 
the jail, and at a later time searched 
and taken for use at the subsequent 
criminal trial. The result is the 
same where the property is not 
physically taken from the defen­
dant until sometime after his incar­
ceration. 109 
The seizure of gunshot resi­
due, 110 fingerprints, 111 bomb resi-
109 Id. at 80 7-808. 
110 See State v. Ulrich, 609 P.2d 12 18 , 
122 1  (Mont. 1980) . 
111 See Napolitano v. United States, 
340 F.2d 3 13 ,  3 14 (1st Cir. 1965) ; Com­
monwealth v. Young, 572 A.2d 1217, 
1224 ( Pa. 1990) . The obtaining of finger­
prints, h owever, is probably not a search 
within the meaning of Fourth Amend­
ment because a person d oes not h ave a 
reasonable expectation of privacy with 
respect to fingerprints. 
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due, 1 12 hair, 1 13 and urine1 14 as well as 
other types of physical evidence1 15 
have been upheld as incident to a 
lawful arrest. Here, again, the Su­
preme Court has shown a greater 
concern for searches involving bodily 
intrusions than for other types of 
searches. For example, in Schmer­
ber, the Court rejected the notion that 
the extraction ofblood is automatical­
ly encompassed by the search inci­
dent to arrest doctrine. According to 
the Court, the justifications underly­
ing that rule 
have little applicability with re­
spect to searches involving intru­
sions beyond the body's surface. 
The interests in human dignity and 
privacy which the Fourth Amend­
ment protects forbid any such in­
trusions on the mere chance that 
112 See United States v. Bridges, 499 
F.2d 179, 180 (7th Cir.) (swabbing of 
h ands for bomb residue), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 1010 (1974) ; United States v. 
Kenaan, 496 F.2d 181, 183 (1st Cir. 
1974) (ultraviolet inspecti on of hands for 
bomb res id ue) . 
113 See United States v. Weir, 657 
F.2d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 1981) ; United 
States v. D'Amico, 408 F.2d 33 1, 333 
(2d Cir. 1969) (clipping ofh ead h air of an 
in-c ustody d efendant not unreasonable) . 
But see Bouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d 548 ,  
550 (9th Cir. 1977) (warrant required for 
removal of h air) ; State v. Gammill, 585 
P.2d 1074, 1077-10 78 (Kan. App. 1978) 
(plucking of pubic h air c onstituted a bodi­
ly intrusion requiring a warrant) . 
1 14· See Ewing v. State, 310 N.E.2d 
571, 578 (Ind. App. 1974) (en bane) . But 
s ee People v. Williams, 557 P.2d 399, 
406 (Colo. 1976) (Schmerber 's "clear 
indication'' standard required for urine 
s ample) . 
115 E. g., Burnett v. Anchorage, 806 
F .2d 144 7, 1450 (9th Cir. 1986) (breath­
alyzer examination) ; United States v. 
Smith, 4 70 F.2d 3 77, 3 79 (D.C. Cir. 
1972) (benzidine swabbings of penis for 
blood) . 
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desired evidence might be ob­
tained. In the absence of a clear 
indication that in fact such evi­
dence will be found, these funda­
mental human interests require law 
officers to suffer the risk that such 
. evidence may disappear unless 
there is an immediate search . 1 16 
The Court further considered the 
necessity of securing a warrant based 
on probable cause as a prerequisite to 
the extraction of blood. It found the 
purpose underlying the warrant re­
quirement-the intervention of a neu­
tral detached magistrate between the 
police and the citizen-applicable to 
bodily intrusions: " The importance 
of the informed, detached and delib­
erate determinations of the issue 
whether or not to invade another's 
body in search of evidence of guilt is 
indisputable and great. " 1 17 Neverthe­
less, because the alcohol content of 
blood diminishes with the passage of 
time, the Court recognized an "emer­
gency" exception to the warrant re­
quirement that was necessary to pre­
clude the destruction of evidence. 
The emergency exception recog­
nized in Schmerber, however , would 
not apply in other contexts-for ex­
ample, when blood is sought for the 
purpose of typing or DNA profiling , 
which involve genetic characteristics 
that remain constant. 1 18 
Surgical Procedures 
The most intrusive procedures that 
have been challenged on Fourth 
Amendment grounds involve the sur­
gical removal ofbullets from suspects 
116 Sch merber v. Californi a, 384 U.S. 
757, 769- 770 (1966) (emph asis added) . 
117 Id. at 770. 
1 1 8  See Graves v. Beto, 301 F. Supp. 
264, 265 (E.D. Tex. 1969), aff'd, 424 
F.2d 524 (5th Cir.) , cen. denied, 400 
U.S. 960 (19 70) ; Mills v. State, 345 A.2d 
12 7, 132 (Md. App. 1975), aff'd, 363 
A.2d 491 (Md. 19 76) . 
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for the purpose of firearms identifica­
tion. The Supreme Court considered 
this issue in Winston v. Lee. 1 1 9 Ac­
cording to the Court: 
The reasonableness of surgical in­
trusions beneath the skin depends 
on a case-by-case approach, L'l 
which the individual's  interests in 
privacy and security are weigbed 
against society 's  interests in con­
ducting the procedure. fu a given 
case, the question whether the 
community 's need for evidence 
outweighs the substantial privacy 
interests at stake is a delicate one 
admitting of few categorical an­
swers . 120 
The Court relied principally on two 
factors to determine that surgery 
would be unconstitutional in Win­
ston. First, the Court referred to the 
risk to the defendant' s  health as a 
"crucial factor . " 12 1  For example, "a 
search for evidence of a criille may 
be unjustifiable if it endangers t.h.e 
life or health of the suspect. ' '  122 The 
Court later noted that the record 
showed uncertainty about the medical 
risks involved. 1 23 Other cases have 
permitted minor surgery, 124 while 
precluding more serious medical pro­
cedures. 125 
1 1 9  470U.S. 753 (1985). 
120 Id. at 760. 
121  Id. at 761 .  
"' Id. 
123 Id. at 763-764. 
124 E. g. ,  Johnson v. State, 521 So. 
2d 1006, 1 01 4-1015 (Ala. Crirn. App. 
1986), aff'd, 521 So. 2d 1018 (Ala. ), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 876 (1988); State 
v. l\1artin, 404 So. 2d 96D, 962-963 (La. 
198 1 ); Hughes v. State, 466 A.2d 533,  
536 (Md. App.), cert. denied, 470 A.2d 
353 (Md. 1 983); Andrews v. Love, 763 
P. 2d 714 (Olda. Crim. App. 1988), cert. 
denied, 489 U.S. 1082 (1989); State v. 
Allen, 291 S.E. 2d 459, 463 (S.C. 1 982). 
125 E. g. ,  Bowden v. State, 510 S. W. 2d 
879 (Ark. 1974) (removal of bullet from 
"176 
Second, the Court found that the 
prosecution's need for the evidence 
was not compelling. There was sub­
stantial additional evidence that could 
be introduced to establish the defen­
dant's guilt; 126 the victim made a posi­
tive and spontaneous identification of 
the accused, and the accused had been 
found with a bullet wound near the 
crime scene soon after its commis­
sion . 
The Court mentioned, but did not 
rely, on two other factors .  First, be­
cause the accused had been provided 
with a fuli adversary hearing and ap­
pellate review, ihe Court declined 
to consider whether. less protective 
safeguards were constitutionally ac­
ceptable. 127 Second , the Court noted 
that some question had been raised 
about the probative value of the evi­
dence because the bullet's  markings 
may have corroded . The Court, how­
ever, stated that it had given little 
\:Veight to t1]is factor oYving to t"'le 
absence of lower court findings on 
the issue . 128 A Florida court has held 
surgery ureasonable because the pro­
bative value of the evidence remained 
doubtful owing to the possible alter­
ation of the bullet's rifling striations 
· by the chemical effect of bodily fluids 
over a four-year period. 129 
LTJ one case in which surgical re­
moval was upheld ,  130 the retrieved 
spinal canal); People v. Smith , 362 
N.Y. S . 2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1 974). 
126 470 U.S.  at 766-767. 
127 Id. at 763 n. 6. See State v. 
Overstreet, 551 S.W. 2d 621, 628 (Mo. 
1977) (en bane) (minor surgery unconsti­
tutional in absence of court approval ). 
128 470 U. S. at 766 n. lO. 
129 Doe v. State, 409 So. 2d 25, 27 
(Fla. App. 1981), review denied, 418 So. 
2d 1 280 (Fla. 1982). 
13° Creamer v. State, 205 S.E. 2d 240 
(Ga. 1 972), cert. dismissed, 4 1 0  tL S .  
975 (1 973). 
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bullet did not match the suspect 
firearm. 13 1  
Administrative Searches 
The Supreme Court first consid­
ered the constitutionality of drug test­
ing procedures in a pail: of 1989 
cases. Both cases involved regulatory 
or administrative searches. Unlike 
law enforcement searches, such pro­
cedures are intended to achieve gov­
ernmental objectives other than the 
detection or prosecution of crime. 
Drug Testing 
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec­
utives ' Ass 'n, 1 32 the Court considered 
regulations issued by the Federal 
Railway Administration. The regula­
tions mandated blood and urine tests 
for railroad employees who are in­
volved in major accidents and permit­
ted testing for employees who violate 
safety rules. The Court rejected the 
contention that permissive inspec­
tions by private railroads, which were 
authorized by the regulations, were 
private searches outside the purview 
of the Fourth Amendment.  133 More­
over, blood, breath, and urine collec­
tion . and testing procedures were 
searches within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
The Court also found, however, 
that the toxicological testing proce­
dures were reasonable. The Court 
balanced the need for the search 
against the invasion of privacy in­
volved, concluding that railroad em­
ployees "discharge duties fraught 
with . . .  risks of injury to others" 
13 1  Emmett v. Ricketts (Creamer) ,  397 
F. Supp. 1025, 1033 n. 14 (N.D. Ga. 
1975). 
132 489 u.s. 602 (1989) . 
133 ld. at 615-616 (The regulati ons 
"are clear indices of the Government's 
encouragement, endorsement, and par­
ti cipat ion, aiid suffi ce to implicate the 
Fourth Amendment.") .  
177 
and "can cause great human loss be­
fore any signs of impairment be­
comes noticeable to supervisors or 
others . " 134 
In a companion case, National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von 
Raab, 135 the Court upheld an employ­
ee drug testing program, which in­
cluded urinalysis, for federal customs 
officials who were transferred or pro­
moted to positions involving the in­
terdiction of illegal drugs or who 
were required to carry a firearm. 
Note that under both Skinner and Von 
Raab, neither probable cause, rea­
sonable suspicion, nor a warrant is 
required. These cases, however, do 
not sanction all governmentally spon­
sored drug-testing procedures . 
DNA Data Bank Testing 
A number of jurisdictions have en­
acted statutes that require blood sam­
ples for persons convicted of crimes, 
or a specific category of crime, such 
as violent crimes or sex offenses. 
These provisions have been chal­
lenged on Fourth Amendment 
grounds. In State v. Olivas, 136 the 
Washington Supreme Court rejected 
a search and seizure challenge to a 
DNA identification sex offender law. 
According to the Court, this provi­
sion constituted a valid regulatory 
search under Skinner. In Jones v. 
Murray, 137 the Fourth Circuit reached 
the same result but under a different 
Fourth Amendment analysis-the di­
minished privacy rights of convicted 
persons. 
Due Process 
The seizure of evidence for scien­
tific analysis also has been challenged 
134 ld. at 628. 
135 489 U.S. 656 (1989) . 
136 856 P.2d 1076 (Wash. 1993). 
137 962 F .2d 302 (4th Cir. ),  cert. 
denied, 1 13 S. Ct. 472 (1992). 
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on due process grounds in several 
cases. In Rochin v. California, 138 de­
cided in 1952, the Supreme Court 
held that the forcible stomach pump­
ing of a suspect to recover narcotic 
pills "shocks the conscience " and 
does not comport with traditional 
ideas of fair play and decency, 139 
thereby violating due process .  
The Court distinguished Roclzin in 
a later case, Breithaupt v. Abram, 140 
in which the Court upheld the com­
pelled extraction of blood . In distin­
guishing the extraction of stomach 
contents from the extraction of 
blood,the Court emphasized that the 
latter procedme, ' 'under the protec­
tive eye of a physician, ' '  was a rou­
tine and scientifically accurate meth­
od and therefore did not involve the 
"brutality " and "offensiveness" 
present in Rochin: 141 This ruling was 
reaffrrmed in Schm.erber. 
Rochin and Breithaupt predated 
the applicability of the Bill of Rights 
to the states L;rough the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment, 142 and thus t.�Je continued validi­
ty of an independent due process anal­
ysis is questionable. Such issues no 
longer need be addressed in terms of 
due process but rather as possible 
violations of specific constitutional 
guarantees enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights. 143 For example, according to 
133 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
139 Id. at 172-173. 
1"0 352 U.S. 432 (1957). 
1 '11  Id. at 435. 
142 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961). 
143 This may explain why Rochin has 
not played a major role in subsequent 
i 78 
the Court in Schmerber, the manner 
in which evidence is obtained from a 
suspect is subject to the reasonable­
ness clause of the Fourth Amend­
ment. 144 This requirement would 
seem to encompass virtually all cases 
that are vulnerable to .attack on due 
process grounds. 145 
ConClusion 
As the use of scientific evidence 
increases, the issues surrounding the 
seizing of evidence for forensic anal­
ysis will grow in importance. The 
DNA cases offer a cogent example. 
While the U . S .  Supreme Court has 
addressed many of these issues, oth­
ers remain unresolved. Moreover, 
the failure of more states to adopt 
nontestimonial procedures seems in­
explicable. 
cases. See Yanez v. Romero, 619 F. 2d 
851, 854 (lOth Cir. ) ("We do not say 
that the Supreme Court' s decision in 
Rocizin has eroded, but we do say that it 
has been applied in a positive way quite 
infrequently. " ), ce11. denied, 449 U.S. 
876 (1980). 
144 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.  
757, 771 (1966). 
145 See People v. Bracamonte, 540 
P. 2d 624, 631 (Cal. 1975) (en bane) 
(forced ingestion of emetic solution vio­
lated Fourth Amendment); State v.  
Strong, 493 N. W. 2d 834, 836 (Iowa 
1992) (Fourth Amendment, rather than 
Rochin, applied to stomach-pumping for 
crack cocaine). 
But see Yanez v. Romero, 619 F.2d 
851, 853 (1Oth Cir. ) (Rochin due process 
' 'prohibition . . . is somewhat broader 
than the limitation provided by the Fourth 
f\_mendment . ") ,  cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
876 (1980). 
